Reddit mentions of Representation and Reality (Representation and Mind)

most philosophers of mind are physicalists:

Accept or lean toward: physicalism 526 / 931 (56.4%)
Accept or lean toward: non-physicalism 252 / 931 (27%)
Other 153 / 931 (16.4%)

Most continental philosophers of mind are non-physicalists.

For reductive physicalism, the strongest work is typically taken to be Kim's, which the following monograph by him lays out well: http://www.amazon.com/Physicalism-Something-Princeton-Monographs-Philosophy/dp/0691113750

Against reductionism, the strongest work is typically taken to be on Multiple Realizability, which started with Putnam. You may want to check out his Representation and Reality.

>In many cases, there's no particular object that you're thinking about, unless we classify concepts or ideas as 'objects'.

In those cases, we are referring to patterns that we can detect.

All that means is that we have a "circle detector", which just means we have neurons that can detect a circle.

Same as how I have "dog detector" neurons. Its the same thing.

>But concepts and ideas appear to be abstract objects, not concrete physical things.

Not as far as I can tell.

It seems we can describe this stuff physically.

>I'm not talking about neurons when I talk in the abstract about cars. This is just obvious.

"this is just obvious" is not an argument.

>If you want to learn more about the prospects for reducing the semantic to the neurophysiological, you should read Putnam's Representation and Reality. I think it'll do a lot to bring you up to speed; I remember finding it helpful, at least.

You're welcome to present whatever is relevant from that in your own words.

> But we're talking about whether or not there's something nonphysical about me being able to read and listen, right? Different things can get me to think about the same object?

In many cases, there's no particular object that you're thinking about, unless we classify concepts or ideas as 'objects'. But concepts and ideas appear to be abstract objects, not concrete physical things.

> As far as I'm concerned, you're talking about something phsyical: neurons.

I'm not talking about neurons when I talk in the abstract about cars. This is just obvious.

If you want to learn more about the prospects for reducing the semantic to the neurophysiological, you should read Putnam's Representation and Reality. I think it'll do a lot to bring you up to speed; I remember finding it helpful, at least.