Best products from r/CredibleDefense

If you want to understand the nature of the war and the strategy used to fight it from the surge (2007) onward I recommend David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War by Fred Kaplan. This book will describe all the big names and texts that helped formulate modern counterinsurgency doctrine and will give you plenty of authors and publications to further explore. To further understand counterinsurgency, I recommend The Accidental Guerilla by David Kilcullen (this link downloads the file, it does not open it a new window) that has a great chapter on Iraq since he was the senior COIN advisor for a few months into the surge. You can also read FM3-24 the original 2006 version, but its a dense read and I recommend you familiarize yourself with the doctrine through other publications before tackling the field manual itself.

Fiasco by Thomas Ricks is a decent history of the run up to the Iraq war and the first years, I would say 2002-2005 is where it is strongest although it does discuss important history prior to 9/11 in the containment of Iraq and some detail into 2006.

From the Surge onward I recommend Ricks' follow on book The Gamble, and The Surge by Peter Mansoor. These books will detail the important changes and in strategy and operational practices that characterized the Surge and the post 2006 war effort.

These are the books I have personally read that best address your questions. Books that are more tactically oriented instead of focusing on the big picture include The Forever War by Dexter Filkins, which is a morbid book that does justice to the horror of the Iraq's sectarian civil war. Thunder Run by David Zucchino is worthy of being a masterpiece in terms of how well the author constructed an incredible narrative on the tank forays into the heart of Baghdad in the early weeks of the war. My Share of the Task by Stanley McChrystal is a great read on McChrystal fomented a significant evolution in JSOC's intelligence culture and operational tempo. This book is of value specifically to what you asked because his men were the ones that were tracking Abu Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, and was the first iteration of what is now known as ISIS. McChrystal describes the structure of Al Qaeda in Iraq, and much of ISIS's organization and methods can be traced back to Zarqawi's leadership.

I don't think you will find any books that will do justice to your interest in terms of recent events however I have some advice that I feel will help you immensely. Simply type in (topic of interest) and end it with pdf into google. This cuts out brief news articles and wikipedia entries and leaves you with top notch reports published by peer reviewed journals and think tanks. This is all free, and its very well researched work.

A report I'm currently reading that I'm sure you will find interesting is Iraq in Crisis by CSIS. It's of course long for a think tank report, but it has a lot of information and great statistics and charts that help the reader better understand Iraq's trends in violence and other challenges. Here are two more interesting reports by well known think tanks that pertinent to what you are looking for.

On the evolution of Al Qaeda and other salafi jihadists by RAND

Iraqi politics, governance and human rights by the Congressional Research Service

Power

>Type 45 travels at a top speed of 32 knots to AB's 30

At what loading? And what suggests that the Burke is limited to 30 kts?

The Zumwalt, for instance, was spec'd to only 30 knots or so but did 33.5 in trials on what looked like a light load. (Also, Zumwalt displaces 40-50% more than Burkes, produces the same 78 MW_shaft, but can still do 33.5 knots. It stands that the much lighter Burke could go faster on the same power (assuming similar admiralty coeffs).)

>Type 45 uses IEP and a combined diesel-electric-gas setup so its shp is difficult to determine and there aren't many sources on it, though it should be a power of 50-60kW+

How are the Daring's engines geared to the shafts? Is it mechanical? Or electric-only? If electric-only, then regardless of total GT+diesel power, the shaft power is limited by the motors, which are 20 MW each. It appears only the electric motors are physically coupled to the props, so total shaft power should be 40 MW. The 2x 2MW diesel alternators don't contribute to shp unless the GTs are operating below capacity/damaged/off. And while the GTs are rated 25 MW each, their associated alternators are only rated to output 21 MW each.

So while total power is 54 MW, only 46 MWe is generated, and only 40 MW is delivered to the shaft. So Burkes still get ~2x shp.

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Royal-Navy-Type-Destroyer-Manual/dp/0857332406

>the AB's 70-80kW

Burkes produce 78 MW_brake. Plus an additional 7.5 MWe of diesel generators on top of that (not available for propulsion obviously).

>Type 45 is also due an upgrade in this regard, adding a third engine

That would be very unusual. I don't recall that being done before. And I don't think the design could accommodate it. GTs have a large footprint (especially the intakes/uptakes) in the coveted heart of the ship where virtually all the volume is already spoken for. They're very tightly integrated into the ship with their gearing, shafts, shock mounts, light armor, careful arrangements to facilitate maintenance and minimize power/propulsion loss (eg multi-engine) in various damage cases (IEP makes arrangements more flexible, but there's still electrical distribution). The voluminous intakes/uptakes run practically from the very bottom of the ship to the very top. To carve out room for a third GT, you'd have to relocate a lot of important stuff from aux machine rooms, to damage control stations, the CIC, the radars, topside launchers, w/e.

To be affordable, you'd have to design it for but not with a third engine. But installing one is not painless. Just replacing existing engines isn't supposed to happen until a major overhaul/upgrade (or if it takes damage, see: DDG-1001) and often includes cutting huge holes in the ship (although I believe some are designed to be lifted out through the stack). But making provisions for a third engine without installing said engine isn't cost effective either. An LM2500+G4 costs just $10-20 million. The concomitant design changes will cost several times that. If you want to save money/fuel/maintenance, install a third engine from the outset, just don't turn it on. That's apparently how the Type 45 was envisioned to use its second GT+diesel most of the time anyway.

So unless you designed the ship for-but-not-with a third GT, it'd be ruinously expensive to add it after-the-fact. It'd be easier to splice in a hull insertion. You'd need to find some crippling design flaw to justify that kind of drastic modification.

So that's why you piqued my interest with "third engine!" Thankfully, I don't think such a calamity occurred. It looks like they're just replacing the old/current 2x 2MW diesel generators with new 3x 2MW diesel generators. https://www.rina.org.uk/Type_45_to_get_third_diesel_generator_to_overcome_problems.html That articles includes more background on IEP issues and continuing work. TLDR: teething issues, insufficient funds for testing

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AAW

>the [Sylver VLS] design is one-deck-level-deep, allowing them to be individually expanded where necessary

Are you sure? The total launcher is 6m tall. The 5m cell alone would be a pretty tall deck, even with 1-2 m protruding above 1-Deck. The A50s look like they span two decks (2-Deck and 3-Deck), right down to the waterline (which is better for CG anyway).

>it currently has 48 SYLVER silos, it is designed to go up to 64

I didn't know that. To the wiki!

"There is provision for another 12[74][84] strike-length VLS tubes forward of the existing VLS. These could be Mk 41 tubes for Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles (TLAM) and LRASM, or Sylver A70 for the MdCN derivative of Storm Shadow." 84: "Early in the design phase it was estimated that 16 strike-length tubes could be fitted and this number has been widely circulated, but as of 2010 the RN website said 12."

>There is also the capability to easily replace them with the more versatile LM Mk41s

I think that's just in reference to the 12 cells yet to be fitted, rather than replacing current Sylver A50 cells.

>The RN believes in multi-layered AAW, prioritising tracking at longer ranges and interception at mid-close ranges with a one-shot-one-kill policy, as this is what has been shown to be the most effective, a lesson partly learnt from the Falklands War. This is why the long-range interception capabilities and slightly fewer missiles are not so important, as it does not abide by RN philosophy.

Let's take that at face value for sake of argument. By the same token, if you run a Burke on the same SLS shot doctrine, you'd get 2-3x the kills because it has (at least) 2-3x the interceptors. You could argue that the Type 45s get better Pks, but probably not 2-3x better or near-perfect (that'd be difficult to substantiate for or against anyway).

Also, SLS is very difficult unless you have either a) supreme interceptor Pks or b) very reliable/capable local+point defenses and soft-kill systems to chase down leakers. I don't know anything about RN defensive EW, but I don't think you should rely on 2x Phalanx. The RIM-116 upgrade you mentioned would help, though I didn't find any concrete plans of it going through yet.

SLS is possible though. The USN itself is moving towards a single-layer, medium-range based defense (rather than multilayered from long- to short-range). But USN includes more than just Phalanx: a) lasers, railguns, and EW to stop leakers (TTT ~0) and to augment medium-range defense, b) SSLS for the time being, and c) a long-range, OTH, offensive AAW effort. Which leads me to…

>This is why the long-range interception capabilities… are not so important, as it does not abide by RN philosophy.

Offensive AAW is important for thinning out the archers before they launch their payloads. The Chinese H-6 can carry 6 AShMs, the B-1B can carry 24, and Soviet Naval Aviation is in/famous for its Backfire regiments armed with Kh-22s. An unmolested strike package (flown by a near-peer) has a sporting chance of saturating your defenses, especially if you magazines are shallow. Even if commanding a CBG in the 80s, you did not want to let your adversary release all their missiles, then wait until "mid-close ranges" to shoot down each and every missile:

They [Soviets] roughly had a Regiment per [our USN] carrier. In a straight-forward engagement, the issue would have been "in doubt" at best. If a strike regiment caught a CV by surprise it would have been curtains. An alerted CV would have a better than even chance of surviving, but probable losses would have been severe. But the Regiment running through fighter opposition to their launch points and then getting back out would have taken crippling losses. They would have not been able to mount a second strike and would have been effectively destroyed if not annihilated. If a missile trap is set so that the regiment is climbing to launch altitude over a missile ship it doesn't know about until the radar comes up and missiles start impacting, the fight will be over before it barely starts. So it was critical for the target to be identified and located prior to the regiment being committed. How to Hide a Task Force http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-031.php

Arguably the RN may never require its forces to be capable of standing against a peer/near-peer's air force (eg just another Argentina), and that's fine (maybe), but we're talking about the "best" AAW destroyer, aren't we? :P

>long-range interception

Affords your escortee maneuvering room (eg deception), less tightly glued to escorts.

> slightly fewer missiles are not so important, as it does not abide by RN philosophy.

Not slightly more. A Burke can host multiple times more SAMs. Realistically about 2-3x more, with cells to spare for other missions, or up to 8x more in an impractical/unlikely loadout (all ESSMs).

>the USN, as it can afford to have more of everything where the RN needs a few ships to do the jobs of many

A Burke sounds great for the RN then :P Better than that single-job Daring, eh? Eh?

Eh. The USN also takes on a lot more missions and is spread pretty thin (three collisions in a couple of months, holy moly). The USN is a bit top-heavy with very capable multi-mission destroyers/cruisers than can "do the jobs of many." But without a lot of smaller assets (like OHPs, corvettes, ESB/MLP/AFSB/ESDs) to pick up constabulary missions, our 10,000 ton ships are stuck doing antipiracy without time for proper mx or training for the high-end fight (like ASW).

>: Did the Japanese ever study how they'd get the raw materials from the captured islands back to Japan? It is my recollection that the Japanese merchant fleet was ill suited to transport significant quantities of oil even before the war began. I am less sure about the Japanese ability to transport large quantities of other materials.

I've read extensively about the IJN and IJA, and by and large, they did not. the Japanese military in general was incredibly bad at logistics and combat support.

> nothing suggests the US public would support a declaration of war on Japan.

I tend to feel the same way, but the Japanese military leadership did not. Perhaps they did not understand the degree to which american leadership was constrained by public opinion.

>With that said, I still think the mistake was attacking Pearl Harbor.

The mistake was going to war with the US, period. The japanese were not a first rate power in the 1930s. they had benefited for years from their geographic isolation and lack of local opposition, which gave them delusions of grandeur, but they were third rate at best. When the best of the Japanese army got absolutely pasted by second rate russian divisions, this should have been a huge wakeup call to japanese leadership. Instead, it was used by the navy as a justification for making war on the US and UK simultaneously.

>the Japanese would have surely cut off China's supply lines and forced the Chinese to surrender or agree to an advantageous peace treaty



Unlikely. resistance by Mao and Chang would have continued, if perhaps much more weakly. China was simply too large for japan to control, a bottomless pit capable of swallowing endless numbers of japanese soldiers and, perhaps more importantly, supplies that they could not spare.

>Japan could have improved upon the Zero fairly easy if its vulnerabilities were discovered - at the very least the generational changes such as a supercharger, pilot armor, self sealing tanks, and larger ammo capacities could have been implemented

Again, not very likely. It is important to remember that while japanese progress at modernization was very impressive, they were no where near the level of the west. My favorite story to demonstrate this is the zero. when it was first built, it was arguably the most advanced plane in the world, but the first prototypes were carried from the factory to the airfield in wooden, horse drawn, hay carts. Japanese industrial development was very shallow, and concentrated in a few frontline areas, with an overall capacity only about that of Italy. the zero was such a lightweight plane because of the inability of japanese industry to build engines of sufficient power density and reliability for heavier planes.

On a more philosophical level, the Japanese were unlikely to discover the weaknesses in their strategy because they would have been spending most of their effort fighting the the chinese and colonial garrisons. Their enormous weaknesses in mechanization and, for lack of a better term, weight, would not have been made apparent battling enemies who were even more industrially deficient than they were. Meanwhile, the US would still have been building big, heavy planes capable of surviving over germany.

>Everything in Hawaii had to be shipped from the United States.

this cuts two ways. the US had a considerably easier time, and much more capacity, for delivering supplies to Hawaii than the Japanese could ever have for delivering ordinance. And in the eastern pacific, there are no islands for bases for subs, planes, etc. to raid those supply lines

>they could have repeatedly sortied 8-10 carriers worth of aircraft on Hawaii's military installations, rendering it unusable for a long period of time.

repeatedly only in the sense of months apart, which would give the US more than enough time for the US to pour far more into Hawaii than the Japanese could ever hope to bring against it. As for invading the islands, it was almost a complete impossibility. The Pearl Harbor operation really represented the limit of japanese logistical capabilities. They did not have the manpower or amphibious transport to mount an invasion on the scale needed to take islands with so many american troops (tens of thousands even before the war). And given the japanese deficiencies in material, artillery, etc, I cannot imagine them storming beaches marine style without truly enormous casualties.

Anyhow, don't mean to be rude, you were asking good questions, I just happen to have read a lot about this particular topic. If you are interested, I would recomend Kaigun and its companion book Sunburst as the single best resource on the IJN. They are masterful books.

edit: several points for clarity.

http://www.amazon.com/Bleeding-Talent-Military-Mismanages-Revolution/dp/0230391273

A slightly related book is this. It gets into fairly decent detail about how the current personnel system fails to promote any type of real innovative thinkers.

Innovative thinking at its very heart involves thinking outside of the scope of established procedure and often results in mistakes.

We now live in a world where a single honest mistake by a talented and well meaning officer is a career ender.

This isn't a system that will foster the best and brightest.

In defense of strategic bombing:

Command of the Air by Giulio Douhet. Douhet was the tip o the spear in advocating an independent mission for air forces who claims that wars can be won before ground troops are even needed.

Winged Defense by Billy Mitchell. Mitchell was the prophet of strategic bombing and advocate of an independent air force in the United States (to the chagrin of the Army at the time).

In defense of airpower as "close air support" for ground troops:

Winning With Allies: The Strategic Value of the Afghan Model. Air power can be highly effective in a close air support role and can tip the balance on the ground, even in support of a weak-ish client.

Breaker of Armies: Air Power in the Easter Offensive and the Myth of Linebacker I and II in the Vietnam War. Essentially the same argument as above.

A counter argument for the two above is: Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq

Academic analysis of air power theory, its evolution and effectiveness:

Bombing to Win By Robert Pape. Been a while since I've read this one. From what I remember he is critical of the theories that say air power can win wars all by themselves by bombing cities and economic nodes, but is most effective in an interdiction role.

Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers
Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917–1945 by David E. Johnson. He traces the efforts of those who wanted an independent air force in the U.S. during the interwar period (tho not the sole focus of the book). I loved this book, very good at showing the bureaucratic hurdles in the way of advocates of strategic bombing and an independent air force.



Disclaimer: This is not all there is to know on air power, just the things I have read myself.

some nitpicking

1. (SAARMEA) should be SAAREMAA
   
   
2. T-34 M43 is mixed up with T-34-85 and T-34 (with 76.2 mm) produced in 1943. Picture is from the latter, while per description it is the former. Note that there were many variations, but 4 major are: T-34/40, T-34/41, T-34/43 and T-34-85 (which was mass produced in 1944). Visually - T-34-85 have very distinct turret, larger than all previous modifications and much longer gun barrel. See side projection on Zaloga's book - highly recommended, BTW. And here's high-quality side projections and photos of many variants - T-34, T-34-85
   
   
3. SU-76 not mentioned. It was ubiquitous. While much less powerful and less protected than other SUs, it was capable of driving over much lighter bridges and on swampy areas and was important tool of close infantry support (and even as AT in a pinch, usually from ambushes).
   
   

I read and liked Red Storm Rising, but that was before I knew enough for it to bother me. (My father, who did ASW work, used to joke with his coworkers about the scene where they remotely detonate a torpedo, though that may have been from Red October.)
If you like tank action, I hear Team Yankee is good, and I quite enjoyed Red Army, both for its perspective shift and its reliance on everything but techno-babble.

Edit: What I mean by techno-babble, when they're describing a column of tanks moving through a blasted village, the author doesn't just rattle off model numbers and call it a day, he describes them very vividly, painting them more as lumbering, animated beasts than machines given designations. I don't think he ever actually gives a model number, ala T-72, throughout the book.

Predecessors of what became Jabhat an-Nusra were active in Iraq of the 2000s. Some of them returned to Syria already in summer 2011, originally with intention of establishing something like the local branch of the AQI (later ISIL/ISIS, then IS etc.).

Ahrar came into being as an umbrella organization of numerous small Islamist, Salafist, and even a few Wahhabist groups. While most of these were established in 2012, their name stems from a group that became active in summer 2011.

Recommended reading in this regards is Lister's The Syrian Jihad: he's really going to great extension into explaining the coming into being of all such groups.

Eh, I personally read the whole thing and learned a fair bit from it so, even though the author's agenda shined through, I'd say it's worth it. I would say just be sure to fact check, but naturally it's hard to do so with the subject material. I'm sure googling certain broad topics will show up results dealing with aliens, conspiracy theories, and what not. As for the guy who responded saying the CIA only had 2 'successes', it sounds like he has a personal bias of his own. As I mentioned earlier, Project Azorian was a success and, in the recent Iraq war, CIA teams/elements were in Iraq successfully convincing military generals and commanders to essentially surrender before the war even started.

If I may, I'd personally recommend Ranelagh's The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA. It's chock-full of well-researched history and has a ton of anecdotes that may tickle your fancy. Plus Ranelagh actually attempts to remain neutral in his work, something academics and professionals should appreciate.

Always the best example. That thing has been around since the 30's and is still used on a lot of military vehicles.

A runner up is the B52, which has been around since the early 50's and is expected to continue until 2040. On that note, it seems like there's a possibility that the A10 will end up like that as well, because even though there's always talk about it getting canceled (even Rumsfeld talked about ending it IIRC) it keeps getting sent into combat. Side note: while the book The Pentagon Wars is predominantly about the Bradley IFV, it does have some great bits early on about the development of the A10.

Other have mentioned basic rifles, and yeah, that's a good one too - we've been improving the M16 since Vietnam, with the M4 being the current incremental evolution, though it's interesting to see the technology you can put on the rifle (targeting lasers, optics, etc).

There's a ton more (U2, C130, etc), so the last one I'll mention here is the SINCGARS radio, which has been around since the 80's and has evolved over time. There were attempts to develop new radios, but they didn't work out.

If you're interested in the subject, you might want to pick up Skunk Works by Ben Rich, who started as a young engineer under Kelly Johnson and eventually went on to run the place after Johnson retired. It's a pretty good read, covering everything from the A-12 OXCART on up to the B-2, and available used pretty cheap.

Sounds like Stephen Biddle's "Military Power" would be up your alley. I'm halfway through my Mlitt in security studies and read this a couple months ago. I found it super interesting.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Military-Power-Explaining-Victory-Defeat/dp/0691128022

> Stealth isn't some sort of get out of jail free card that let's you ignore air defenses

THis.

Stealth simply reduces the radar cross section of an aircraft. Many dedicated stealth aircraft also have methods to reduce the infrared signature and the sound signature.

If you read "Skunk Works" book by Ben Rich, it has a great lay mans explanation of how this works in terms of aircraft.

Radar works by essentially creating an electronic "ping" and then listening for the echo when it bounces off distant objects.

Anything will generate some echo. Square lines and big flat metal surfaces reflect radar the most.

Rounded surfaces or angled surfaces can reflect radar away from the reciever, so that even if an echo is generated, some of it gets bounced somewhere else.

Certain substances like wood, or certain composites, tend to absorb more radar than they send back.

All of these reduce the radar cross section.

Something like an F-15 is like a literal "barn door" on a radar screen. The big square intakes, square fins, etc. create big flat surfaces.

The SR71, which was incidentally stealthy, initially at least by accident, has the cross section of a much much smaller aircraft, like a small cessna. It can be picked up by radar, but it's so high and so fast, usually it's out of radar range before anything can be done about it.

The F117 is the size of a large bird on a radar return. You have to have a very high powered radar, very close, to pick it up. It also is subsonic only and has ducted engines which reduces it's infrared signature.

The B2, despite it's size, is even smaller than the F117, with the assitance of computer aided design. Kelly Johnson desicribed this as the difference between an Eagle and an Eagle's Eyeball.

The radar returns of the F22 and the F35 are classified, but given they are trade offs between performance and stealth, probably are closer to the F117 than the B2. Low observable, but not completely undetectable.


And like /u/darthpizza notes, not all radars react the same way. A very low frequency radar may pick up some things that a normal high frequency radar might not. However, low frequency radars have their drawbacks.

The Dictator's Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes by Caitlin Talmadge

The RAND monograph Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak by Stephen Hosmer offers an overview of why Saddam's coup-proofing weakened the Iraqi Military and then gives a surprising amount of detail on specific examples with some very funny anecdotes regarding Uday and Qusay. :)

The Syrian Jihad by Charles Lister has some great information about the SAA's effectiveness during the Syrian civil war 2011-2015 if you're willing to wade through a lot of information about small jihadi groups.

Saddam Husayn and Civil-Military Relations in Iraq: The Quest for Legitimacy and Power by Ahmed Hashim has some great info on Saddam's defense policy of coup-proofing and its effects on military effectiveness.

The Iraqi Army and Anti-Army: Some Reflections on the Role of the Military by Faleh Jabar addresses much of the same things as Hashim's piece.

Finally, Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History by Ibrahim al-Marashi and Sammy Salama is a broad overview of Iraq's military.

I have a long list of books that I usually recommend to people who are interested in these types of subjects. Here are some that may be of interest to you. If you are ever interested in more books on the Middle East or international affairs issues, check out the r/geopolitics wiki.

As for the books that have been recommended to you, they are pretty good. I even repeated a few of them in my recommendations. The only ones that I would have reservations about are Gen. Daniel Bolger's because I have never read it.

Author | Title | Synopsis
---|---|----
Daniel Byman | Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement: What Everyone Needs to Know | A terrific primer on al-Qaida, ISIL, and jihadism. Its a brief outline of the history of al-Qaida, its ideological underpinnings, and the rise of ISIL in the shadow of the Syrian Civil War.
Lawrence Wright | The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 | Probably the most approachable and argueably the best book for outlining the pro-9/11 history of al-Qaida and why 9/11 happened.
Michael Wiess and Hassan Hassan | ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror | One of several recent books on ISIL, this one provides an overview on the history and organization of ISIL.
Charles Lister | The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency | Written by an expert on jihadism in Syria, this books looks at the history and evolution of jihadists in the Syrian conflict.
Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger | ISIS: The State of Terror | Written by two top experts in the study of terrorism, this book focuses on how ISIL radicalizes and recruits individuals from all over the world to join their cause.
William McCants | The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State | An examination of ISIL's worldview and how it influenced its growth and strategy.
Kenneth Pollack | The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America | An excellent overview of the history of relations and tensions between the United States and Iran over the decades. Pollack published a second book on U.S.-Iranian relations in the wake of Iran's nuclear program called Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb, and American Strategy
Bob Woodward | Obama's Wars | Outline of the U.S. foreign policy decision making towards Iraq and Afghanistan in the early years of the Obama administration.
Michael R. Gordon | The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama | Follows U.S. strategic and political decision making process during the Iraq War and the U.S. occupation.
Peter R. Mansoor | Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War | An extensive outline of the development and outcome of the Surge during the U.S. Occupation of Iraq.
Mark Mazzetti | The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth | An overview of the CIA's targeted drone program against terrorist organizations.
Michael Morrell | The Great War of Our Time: The CIA's Fight Against Terrorism--From al Qa'ida to ISIS | Written by the former acting director of the CIA, this book examines U.S. counterterrorism successes and failures of the past two decades.