(Part 2) Best products from r/WarCollege

Thank you all, I am very interested in Alexander Pylcyn's book. A first-hand account of what it was like in a penal unit sounds very cool.

I will also be looking at tank rider.

Has anyone read Panzer Destroyer? This one seems very interesting as well.

Hermann Kahn's On Thermonuclear War & Thinking about the Unthinkable in the 1980s are still go-to texts for nuclear strategy.

The Parallel History Project is a good resource for Early to Mid Cold War era Warsaw Pact warplanning.

The CIA's Historical Collections contain declassified documents regarding US assessments of the WP and Soviet stances, The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers in particular.

For some interesting context, the GWU's National Security archive has some documents showing US intelligence failures.

Unfortunately, you will run into the secrecy wall really quick in this area, since nuclear strategy is more a political strategy, than a strictly military one, and grand strategy like this hangs around a good, long while (for example, I am not aware of any declassified Single Integrated Operational Plans).

IMHO, it all depends on what exactly do you want to read: geo-political backgrounds or military history; official line based on recollections and opinions, or official documentation; and, then it of course depends on whether you want to take sides or remain neutral.

From my POV, starting point for anybody with intention of obtaining a neutral position requires the reading of such works like:

• Arabs & Israel For Beginners
  
  At first look, this one might appear as 'on the light side', or at least a 'light/easy to use'. Actually, this is a concise, well-supported collection of historical facts, providing an indispensable introduction to the Arab-Israeli conflict. IMHO, it shouldn't be missing from any serious reading list to this topic.
  
  
• Taking Sides: America's Secret Relations with a Militant Israel, 1948-1967.
  
  Partially used as a source of reference for above-mentioned work by David, this one is also an indispensable read. It is based on primary sources - foremost official US documentation that seems to have been completely ignored by all other authors. 'Taking Sides' is a relatively small book, but it is incredibly well-supported, detailed, and offering clear insights into the coming into being of Israel (and the US support for the same); into how Israel actually survived the first 20 years following its creation; and then especially into how Israel established itself in a position of military hegemony over most of the Middle East.

The post-adoption history of the M14 is something of a trash fire, but the theoretical motivation was sound.

Springfield Armory is today a civilian company selling rifles, however in the mid 50s it was a Government arsenal developing rifles and other weapons at the Army's behest. The design work for the M14 was thus done in-house by the US Army, originally stemming from developmental work on the M1 Garand in the mid to late 40s. The rifle was thus not only viewed with favor as an "in-house" product which could be redesigned to suit the Army's needs when needed (something that would be arguably lacking during the M16's development), but as being a continuation of the M1 Garand's legacy. Think of the question in this manner - which is better, a rifle which is an improved version of your existing rifle with the upgrades you've wanted for almost a decade, or an entirely new rifle made by a foreign company that you have no experience with? In fact, the rifle is a modification of an existing pattern, which means you should in theory be able to reuse existing tooling. The task of tooling up to produce a rifle is no small feat - part of the reason why the Garand succeeded so well and the M14 failed so badly is the former's excellent investment in tooling, and the latter's trash fire production quality. That the tooling was not in the end reusable doesn't change the perception of decision makers at the time.

The consensus of historians is that many elements of the tests, such as the infamous Arctic trials, were overblown in the M14's favor. I'm not necessarily sure on that - the M14 had been designed from the ground up to fire T65, the experimental version of 7.62 NATO, whereas the FAL had to make the jump from 7.92x33 Kurz to .280 British to 7.62, which may have left it in a less mature state with regards to reliability (esp regarding the gassing of the rifle). The M14 is also lighter by about a pound, which is a non-zero benefit. We're thus left with a mix of political and technical reasons. For further study, I'd suggest US Rifle M14 - from John Garand to the M21 by Stevens. Scouring should manage a PDF.

/u/DegnarOskold Has given a pretty solid brief overview, if you ever wanted to have every question you just asked answered exhaustively I can only recommend N. A. M. Roger's book The Command of the Ocean.

Ships generally didn't need to scavenge from defeated vessels for parts, as they generally carried basic repair material and could then limp to a friendly port. In fact, especially by the time of the Napoleonic Wars, the logistical system for sail fleets was very well developed and there were drydocks and all manner of depots to repair vessels that had been damaged.

As far as tactics goes there were differing philosophies, the Royal Navy specifically pushed it's captains for maximum aggression, relying on their well drilled crews to close distance and then rapidly deliver a lethal weight of fire, followed either by forcing a surrender or boarding. The book I just linked reports that for brief periods a well drilled crew could fire up to 4 or 5 rounds per minute per gun, though obviously that would not be sustainable it was often enough to win the engagement outright. The risk of closing range is that most guns in the age of sail were mounted broadside, and that meant that you would often be open to fire without being able to return it during the approach.

The natural consequence of this close range approach is that boarding was done as a matter of course as the ships rigging and masts would lock together.

Other navies of the period preferred longer range gunnery focused on disabling the opposing ship. This was safer, but much less likely to be immediately decisive as both vessels would retain the ability to disengage if they caught favorable winds.

What a fantastic summary. I have a friend who's a bit obsessed with Jutland, and I'm hoping you could recommend a book for me.

Is this as good as the reviews seem to indicate?
https://www.amazon.com/Jutland-Unfinished-Personal-History-Controversy/dp/1848323212

The best book on this subject is Wages of Destruction which discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the german war economy in great detail. In brief, the biggest limit on german industrial potential was raw resources, thought there were also weaknesses in sheer mass of industrial capacity and and inefficient agriculture sector. The factories might not have been abandoned, but the allied air campaign diverted huge quantities of material (including a disproportionate share of scarce raw materials like aluminium) away from the USSR and into the defense of the reich. The russians, of course, also had massive shortages of engineering talent and an inefficient agriculture sector, but these disadvantages were more than compensated for by the immense amount of western, mainly american, aid.

Best resource (I think) would be the 80's modernization of the Iowa class ships. The Wikipedia article has a few details but the best details about the work it took the really make the ships seaworthy (which I think is the main crux of your question) should be available here: https://www.amazon.ca/Battleships-United-States-1935-1992/dp/1557501742/ref=pd_sim_14_3?_encoding=UTF8&psc=1&refRID=4SWE9NVVD8HS8ES917V2

I seem to remember an excellent section of repairing massive damage of the double/triple bottom of most of the ships etc.

Lots of the ones I was gonna say are already mentioned, but Fangs of the Lone Wolf is very interesting.

I also have David Kilcullen's The Accidental Guerilla, but haven't had an opportunity to dive into it yet. His other book [Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerilla] (https://www.amazon.com/Out-Mountains-Coming-Urban-Guerrilla-ebook/dp/B00DY3FFMS/ref=sr_1_2?s=digital-text&ie=UTF8&qid=1543531869&sr=1-2&keywords=the+accidental+guerilla) looks really fascinating as well, especially looking toward the future with urban sprawl and the rise of megacities/megapolises (sp?).

You can get it via interlibrary loan. That's how I got them, a lot of university libraries have them and will led to local public libraries. I don't think all are translated into English yet.

They cover more than just Germany's side of the conflict, but that is the primary focus. Honestly it is far better than most general histories I've seen.

You can also check out James Holland's series on WW2:

https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B00XAQ1P46/ref=dbs_a_def_rwt_bibl_vppi_i2

https://www.amazon.com/Allies-Strike-Back-1941-1943-West/dp/B076VW6YN5/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=9780802190147&linkCode=qs&qid=1569193097&s=books&sr=1-1

Still waiting on the third volume, but so far it's not bad.

Just curious - could you elaborate what makes you think that?
For example, M249 is crew-served machine gun - still in service. M2 is also in service around the globe. Russian army has 12.7mm Kord, 7.62 mm - PKP Pecheneg, China has Type 85 etc.

Very short answer is No. A little more elaborate ...and never will. Some branches in some armies (USMC) are experimenting, but that's all.

MGs and HMGs are capable of sustained fire at much higher practical rate for much longer time with superior precision (vs automatic rifles). It sums up to more projectiles being delivered per time with higher penetration at longer distances - which is critical in both offense and defense.