Reddit mentions of War of Intervention in Angola. Volume 1: Angolan and Cuban Forces at War, 1975-1976 (Africa@War)

Part 2

In Angola, and for most of the Op Carlotta, the MMCA and the FAR had roughly the same number of troops like the SADF, yet they had to maintain three frontlines: one in the Cabinda enclave, against the FLEC; another north of Luanda, against the FNLA; and the 600-kilometres long one south of Luanda, against the SADF and UNITA. Still, and together with Angolans (few times also 'despite' the latter), they smashed the FLEC; beat back the FNLA and stopped the South African advance (Pretoria subsequently withdrew its troops, when these failed to reach Luanda by the Angolan Independence Day, and the USA then withdrew their support). In the case of the SADF's attack on Cassinga, the GT-2 was rushed to the battlefield without any preparation, and suffered havy losses to the SAAF air strikes and ambushes by the paras.

The Cuban generals in Angola were quick in recognizing the importance of air power and manoeuvre. Furthermore, they insisted on not scattering MMCA's and FAR's troops amid allied forces. Correspondingly, they usually didn't move their troops outside the range of their combat aircraft, and they nearly always deployed them at least in company-sized formations. Finally, they had a major issue with the leadership of the MPLA (which, after Neto's death, converted into a gang of corrupt opportunists, that couldn't care less about what was going on in Angola south of Namibe, and east and south-east of Huambo).

But, when they moved, then often in a fashion that prompted South Africans into thinking 'it must've been East Germans' that were in command. Actual situation was such that troops were few, supplies meagre, and distances immense. Mind that everything - except for water and some of the food - had to be brought to the country, and then distributed to the units often deployed hundreds of kilometres away from each other. Still, whenever a Cuban unit was threatened by the enemy, the FAR's reaction can only be described as 'vicious'.

In offensive operations, the Cuban commanders frequently applied the so-called 'Auftragstaktik'. A 'classic' example for such operations would be the advance of the 2 Bon I (an Angolan motorised infantry battalion led by the Cubans) east and north-east of Luanda, in December 1975 and January 1976: acting entirely on his own (after receiving the order to move out, of course), and out of radio-range to his superiors, the Cuban commander of that unit outflanked any of FNLA's positions recognized on time and, even if advancing very cautiously, found a 'gap' in these and then run something like 300 kilometres deep into the enemy territory, thus collapsing the entire insurgent position in north-western Angola.

In defensive operations, the Cubans proved though opponents, that had to be destroyed in order to fall back. Their commanders usually applied quite 'classic' methods, like 'two up and third in reserve' - i.e. two elements would hold the frontline, and the reserve launching flanking counter-attacks.

IMHO, it's the Cuban COIN methods that experienced the biggest development over the time. No matter how little means they've got assigned, generals like Tomassevic proved highly successful, actually. Their major problem was that their and allied COIN units and garrisons were de-facto left on their own device (at least by the MPLA), and scattered all over central, eastern and southern Angola. Thus, they were easy pickings for the insurgents: whenever the UNITA attacked them, it took days for help to arrive. Even so, during the battle of Cangamba, in 1983, they performed stellar, holding their positions (and thus maintaining cohesiveness of their Angolan allies, too), even when their defence perimetre was penetrated by insurgents in multiple places. They were not too shy from heliborne deployment of special troops deep within insurgent-controlled territory, adapting their units and equipment to local requirements: actually, it's rather so that the Cuban deployment of MRAPs based on chassis of the Soviet-made Ural trucks and formation of special units for COIN operations remains next to unknown in the West.

Overall, this is actually a very interesting topic, that's experiencing something like 'boom' lately, foremost thanks to 'opening' of Cuba and thus the availability of a host of publications released by local veterans, but also the availability of official documentation. My references are corresponding. For political aspects of most of these affairs - and that based on Cuban documentation - see such (meanwhile 'classic') works by Piero Gleijeses like

• Conflicting Missions, and
  
  
• Visions of Freedom
  
  For military histories, see:
  
  
• Hot Skies over Yemen, Volume 1
  
  
• Wings over Ogaden
  
  
• War of Intervention in Angola, Volume 1
  
  
• War of Intervention in Angola, Volume 2
  
  Note: interestingly, the accumulated Cuban experiences proved highly successful in Nicaragua of 1987-1988, when General Ochoa not only convinced the Sandinistas into launching a general counter-offensive against the Contras, but also 'externals' into Honduras. These proved crucial for the eventual outcome of that war (for details, see Nicaragua 1961-1990).