(Part 2) Best products from r/CredibleDefense

John Nagl's Learning To Eat Soup With A Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam is a great read. Nagl contrasts the successful British counterinsurgency in Malaya with the unsuccessful US counterinsurgency in Vietnam and tries to analyze what lessons the US military can take to be more successful at counterinsurgency in the future.

I've read Grunts. I highly recommend it. I wanted to be in infantry myself, so I found it particularly interesting.

Edit: A very good book especially for those like myself who have no military background I think. I think it's also good for military readers, of course, but as one of the reviews said, something like "The closest you can get to combat without being in it." It was a very emotionally difficult read at times but very compelling, insightful, and rewarding.

The biggest difference between meth and Adderall is how they're sold and marketed. Users can't tell the difference. Most meth-users prefer pharmaceutical grade Adderall to the shit people were making in their basements.

If you want to read more i highly recommend On Speed by Nicolas Rasmussen. He goes into its military use in WW2, where entire armies (and countries) were popping these things like candy.

8Not warfare per se but interrogation tactics intermixed with psychological warfare.

https://www.amazon.com/Interrogator-Joachim-Luftwaffe-Schiffer-Military/dp/0764302612

Very good book with an interesting writing style. But even in written form you can experience just how charming the guy was.

The book also gives quite a lot of information how they tried to influence prisoners to let them believe they knew all about them or how to make em talk without them realising they where giving new information.

If you want a great and contemporary work on this topic I would recommend Robert D. Kaplan's Monsoon: http://www.amazon.com/Monsoon-Indian-Ocean-Future-American/dp/0812979206

On China, India, the US and the shift of both the economic and military center of gravity from the West to the East.

Russian Warriors: Sukhois, Migs and Tupolevs

This one is light on words and such, more graphics, beautiful 1980s and early 90s photography of Russian birds

Yefim Gordon wrote a much more in-depth analysis/background book on the MiG-29 that covers the development and growth. All those books are fantastic

I have a bunch of these. You can find some of them through Osprey Publishing and the US Naval Institute press has some others.

If you're interested in reading General Bolger's book, the hardcover is only $2.94 new on Amazon with Prime free shipping.

> I'll concede the point that the US is very concerned by Chinas's rise but Russia's?

Wolfowitz Doctrine, 1992

"Russian threat" segment, unedited (ie "before being leaked") version:

> We continue to recognize that collectively the conventional forces of the states formerly comprising the Soviet Union retain the most military potential in all of Eurasia; and we do not dismiss the risks to stability in Europe from a nationalist backlash in Russia or efforts to reincorporate into Russia the newly independent republics of Ukraine, Belarus, and possibly others....We must, however, be mindful that democratic change in Russia is not irreversible, and that despite its current travails, Russia will remain the strongest military power in Eurasia and the only power in the world with the capability of destroying the United States.

This translates well in what is now happening in Ukraine. Here is was mister Brzezinski has to say about Ukraine in his book:
> Ukraine, a new and important space on the Eurasion chessboard, is a geopolitical pivot because its very existence as an independent country helps to transform Russia. Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire. Russia without Ukraine can still strive for imperial status, but it would then become a predominantly Asian imperial state, more likely to be drawn into debilitating conflicts with aroused Central Asians, who would then be resentful of the loss of their recent independence and would be supported by their fellow Islamic states to the South.

Furthermore,

> Indeed, the Ukraine’s relationship to Europe could be the turning point for Russia itself. But that also means that the defining moment for Russia’s relationship to Europe is still some time off – ‘defining’ in the sense that Ukraine’s choice in favor of Europe will bring to a head Russia’s decision regarding the next phase of its history: either to be a part of Europe as well or to become a Eurasian outcast, neither truly of Europe nor Asia and mired in its ‘near abroad’ conflicts.

I suggest you digging up the book. It contains quite a number of interesting thoughts regarding the relationship between Ukraine and Russia. Unfortunately, I can't provide the most interesting of them right now.

Edit: fixed the link

> The Saudis supported the Imamate during the Civil war in the 60s. Southern Republicanism and Pan-Arab nationalism did a lot more to sideline them than Saudi Arabia ever did.

There are few points about that affair: according to recently released British documentation (see 'The War that Never Was'; http://www.amazon.com/War-That-Never-Duff-Hart-Davis/dp/1846058252?ie=UTF8&*Version*=1&*entries*=0), it was actually British who convinced Saudis to support Royalists - financially. So, Saudis provided all the funding, but otherwise barely got involved. British in turn then began supporting Royalists; brought in Jordanians (part of this operation failed because a better part of the RJAF defected to Egypt, in 1964, together with several Hunters; see 'Arab MiGs' Volumes 3 and 4; http://www.amazon.com/Arab-MiGs-June-1967-War/dp/0982553994/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1463138050&sr=1-1&keywords=arab+migs+volume+3), Iranians, even Israelis etc. Saudis became 'more directly' involved only around 1966, and then primarily in form of 'defensive activity' (usually in form of British-flown Hunters, and then Lightnings flying CAPs along mutual border).

Meanwhile, following Arab defeat in the June 1967 War with Israel ('Six Day War'), Saudis began financing spread of Wahhabism around the World (see 'Sleeping with the Devil'; http://www.amazon.com/Arab-MiGs-June-1967-War/dp/0982553994/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1463138050&sr=1-1&keywords=arab+migs+volume+3). Thus, as soon as the (North) Yemeni Civil War of the 1960s ended, they began buying influence in the country through 'financing' various Sunni tribes there.

Such and similar affairs (and plenty of reading of various old books, like for example Dana Adam Schmidt's 'Yemen: the Unknown War') resulted in my understanding that while (North) Yemeni Republicans (supported by Egyptians 1962-1967, and then by Soviets, 1967-1979) began the process of sidelining Zaidis, it was Saudis who completed it.

That said, and in relation to your second observation: Saleh is a Zaidi too, yet he was supported by Saudis - at least starting with the 1990s, and then precisely in exchange for letting Wahhabists into his security apparatus.

How comes? Guess, they understood him as the only one able to keep the country together. Plus, he never did anything against their attempts to convert ever more Yemeni Shafis (Sunnis) to Wahhabism, nor against ever increasing influence of the Islah Party or similar 'elements' and 'factors'.

The rift took place only in 2011, when Saleh was forced to resign after parts of the Army openly sided with the Islah and turned against him.

So, how comes now that out of 80 Yemen Army and Yemen Air Force Brigades existent as of early 2015, at least 45 sided with Saleh and thus Houtis?

(Note: in comparison, only 4-5 brigades sided with Hadi, 3 were overrun and disarmed by the AQAP, while the rest - apparently foremost brigades composed of troops siding with the Islah Party - something like 'remained neutral'.)

I think this is the crucial question behind the entire story of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen of 2015. Indeed, I consider this issue so important, that it took even Saudis by surprise.

Call it a guess if you like, then I can't support the following with any kind of a study or some other sort of publications, only by my own conclusions from 'connecting dots'... whatever... but I'm convinced the Hadi didn't expect this to happen. So, he run to Riyad to tell Saudis something like, 'just march in and the entire YA is going to turn against Houthis... the rest is then going to be a piece of cake, especially with your air support'. And Saudis fell for this, and launched their intervention.

I'll try to explain what brought me to this conclusion.

Researching, talking with Yemenis, then few well-informed people in the USA, and thinking about this issue brought me to a conclusion that one of reasons might be that we all have got no clue about exact composition of Yemeni population. Or at least that so much changed about this issue (perhaps because Houthis in recent years have 'overrun' and disbanded several powerful tribal confederations?), that what is usually available as source of reference, is hopelessly obsolete.

For example, usual publications cite that the Yemeni population is made of something like 30 (40% at most) of Zaidis. However, during few (relatively) free elections that took place since 1990, most of votes (approx 60%) went to Saleh's GPC, which could be described at least as something like 'Zaidi-dominated' Party. So, either it is so that the usual info on composition of Yemeni population is entirely (and purposedly?) wrong, or there are plenty of Shafis that... hm... 'like/favour', or were at least bribed to support a Zaidi president in power?

Whatever is the reason, it seems that not only there are many more Zaidis than usually assessed, but there are many more of them in the military (or at least in the former YA), too. In turn, this would explain abyssmal failures (if not outright 'catastrophes') of the YA in fighting Houthis in period 2004-2011... which came as a sort of a surprise, then the same YA was actually performing very good when fighting the AQAP - if it was only left to do so (whether by Saleh at earlier times, or by Hadi since 2012).

An additional element was certainly opposition of some of the Shafi to the Islah, but also to the AQAP. Houthis always fought AQAP, so they were probably a 'more attractive alternative' for any Shafi disagreeing with Jihadists (it might be so that 'majority of Yemenis' are rather 'conservatively religious', but this means not they are all 'extremists').

Result: it was a strategic surprise - for Hadi, for Saudis, and those few foreign observers to pay attention at all - when nearly 60% of the YA sided with Houthis.

But: this process was not really 'sudden'. It was rather so that nobody paid attention about this before, say, sometimes in April 2015. I.e. once Houthis drove down to Aden in a matter of 'few days' - literally 'collecting/taking with them' (but hardly ever fighting) a number of YA units in the process. It was only then that it became known that YA units began siding with them at all (actually: this affair remains completely unknown in the wider public). Only then did people start researching about this topic. And only then did we also got surprised to find out that this process began as soon as Houthis reached Sana'a, namely in September 2014...

'However'... this should not mean that no elements of the YA have decided otherwise, i.e. that no YA units sided with the Islah Party. It's just so that majority of such cases remain unknown. For example, only on 1 May this year, it became known that a brigade in Umaliqa that sided with the Islah but remained neutral for all of the last 15 months, came under Houthi attack and was subsequently overrun. Indeed, this was the reason for latest breach of cease-fire, about 60 Saudi-led air strikes, and the YA then launching its latest SSM-attack on Khamis Mushayt (the Scud was then shot down by Saudi PAC-3s), all of which occurred the last weekend.

So, conclusion is on hand that it's really so that 'nothing is simple' in this war.

Saleh was already mad about being abandoned by Saudis: no surprise he turned against them. Houthis were against Saudi influence anyway. But, Islah's standpoints were less obvious. Now it appears that the pro-Islah wing of the army remained neutral. Reason: Saudis declared the Moslem Brotherhood (major force behind the Islah) for a terrorist organization, sometimes back in 2012-2013, and distanced themselves from it, apparently over differences in regards of Egypt. But then, they removed the MBs from that list and re-established ties in 2014.

Somehow, I find it little surprising if the Islah-sympathisers within the ranks of the YA then proved rather 'sceptical' about (Saudi) appearance and intentions in Yemen.

EDIT for some grammar and syntax (hope, this 'wall of text' is still readable and useful, though)

I have a long list of books that I usually recommend to people who are interested in these types of subjects. Here are some that may be of interest to you. If you are ever interested in more books on the Middle East or international affairs issues, check out the r/geopolitics wiki.

As for the books that have been recommended to you, they are pretty good. I even repeated a few of them in my recommendations. The only ones that I would have reservations about are Gen. Daniel Bolger's because I have never read it.

Author | Title | Synopsis
---|---|----
Daniel Byman | Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement: What Everyone Needs to Know | A terrific primer on al-Qaida, ISIL, and jihadism. Its a brief outline of the history of al-Qaida, its ideological underpinnings, and the rise of ISIL in the shadow of the Syrian Civil War.
Lawrence Wright | The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 | Probably the most approachable and argueably the best book for outlining the pro-9/11 history of al-Qaida and why 9/11 happened.
Michael Wiess and Hassan Hassan | ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror | One of several recent books on ISIL, this one provides an overview on the history and organization of ISIL.
Charles Lister | The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency | Written by an expert on jihadism in Syria, this books looks at the history and evolution of jihadists in the Syrian conflict.
Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger | ISIS: The State of Terror | Written by two top experts in the study of terrorism, this book focuses on how ISIL radicalizes and recruits individuals from all over the world to join their cause.
William McCants | The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State | An examination of ISIL's worldview and how it influenced its growth and strategy.
Kenneth Pollack | The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America | An excellent overview of the history of relations and tensions between the United States and Iran over the decades. Pollack published a second book on U.S.-Iranian relations in the wake of Iran's nuclear program called Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb, and American Strategy
Bob Woodward | Obama's Wars | Outline of the U.S. foreign policy decision making towards Iraq and Afghanistan in the early years of the Obama administration.
Michael R. Gordon | The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama | Follows U.S. strategic and political decision making process during the Iraq War and the U.S. occupation.
Peter R. Mansoor | Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War | An extensive outline of the development and outcome of the Surge during the U.S. Occupation of Iraq.
Mark Mazzetti | The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth | An overview of the CIA's targeted drone program against terrorist organizations.
Michael Morrell | The Great War of Our Time: The CIA's Fight Against Terrorism--From al Qa'ida to ISIS | Written by the former acting director of the CIA, this book examines U.S. counterterrorism successes and failures of the past two decades.

Reading a great book right now, Blind Mans Bluff.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B0089EMLGK/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?ie=UTF8&btkr=1

This is exactly right.

During Vietnam the USSR had subs tailing US CAG's with nuclear weapons...

The Sub force was meant to survive the initial exchange, and respond in kind. As theoretically, they were travelling undetected and safe from the initial strikes.

And your details can be therefore be found here in the About the Author section. For my part, it looks like the definition of an expert!

He's Austrian, I believe.

This was an interesting conversation to follow.